MOST of those who are interested in psychopathology are prepared to admit that repression and dissociation are processes which underlie many of the symptoms of psychoneuroses and psychoses. We may, however go further than this, for we may see the same processes at work in the normal individual. Since none of us are perfectly adjusted either in respect of the interplay of our own impulses and emotions or in our relation to the environment, we have to make use of some means of reducing or overcoming the friction produced by this maladjustment, and repression and dissociation are two of the commonest means whereby this avoidance of friction is achieved. We are all familiar with the tendency to deny the existence of certain events or impulses and the logic-tight compartments built round incompatible constellations. It is our object to find an explanation of these two functions which accords more with physiological principles than do many of those advanced by the newer schools of psychopathology. Many presentations of Freud's teaching seem to bear too anthropomorphic an appearance, describing as they do the field of consciousness with a censorship dividing it from an unconscious realm containing repressed and dissociated material. Freud's own concept of the censor, however, was formulated simply as a convenient means of description and he deliberately left any physiological explanation on one side; his description of the censor is of a barrier and nothing more.
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If we are to obtain any conception of what we mean by the terms 'repression' and ' dissociation ' from the physiological standpoint, we must try to find a common ground of expression between physiology and psychology. I believe that this can be discovered in the concept of a strict correlation between patterns of behaviour and patterns of neuronic activity. I think that everyone will agree that there can be no expression of mind as we know it without the activity of brain; and that no activation of brain takes place without some phenomena which may be objectively recorded by an observer and/or subjectively experienced by the individual concerned, and which may legitimately be called mental.
The acceptance of such a postulate does not commit us in any way to accepting any theory as to causality; we do not say that mental activity is nothing but a phenomenon of cerebral activity on the one hand, or that the psychological situation determines the activation of a certain group of neurones on the other. We do not even concern ourselves whether mental and cerebral activity is interdependent or independent. These are subjects which may safely be left to the metaphysicians. At low levels we are content to regard the observed effects as correlated with the activity of neurones which we can actually recognize and map out. This is true of the various reflexes whose paths through the nervous system have recently been described with an increasing degree of accuracy. At such levels we are not accustomed to describe any 'mental effects,' but it does not do to be too dogmatic as to the absence of such effects. This applies more especially to reflexes in the vegetative field, for who shall say how much such reflex actions contribute to general coenaesthesia, which is an important factor in mental situations ? As we get higher in the scale it becomes less and less possible to trace out the actual neuronic paths, but we can still envisage the locality of various functions. We know the importance of the structures in the floor of the fourth ventricle in relation to vital function and the regulation of the vegetative organs. We now recognize the importance of the interbrain and more particularly the subthalamic region in relation to primitive affective and more especially painful reactions. To quote Tilney: Clinical evidence seems to be insistent th2,t the thalamus is a centre for affective tone. Its irritation or destruction leads to changes in affective expressions and attitudes. The thalamus is a part which when diseased may lead to forced laughing and crying. It is a primary centre for involuntary movements and emotional expression. Psychic processes representing a certain degree of consciousness may be carried on by the thalamus independent of the cerebral cortex. These processes are probably limited to painful sensations. The thalamic centres are chiefly concerned with affective experience. Destructive lesions which involve the cortex alone do not necessarily disturb the painful and affective qualities of sensibility." Such functions are of course co-ordinated, discriminated and controlled through their connexions with the cortex. " Personality and behaviour in their most complex form still retain their relations to the primitive emotions. The archaic current of feeling tone arising from the interbrain pervades all the higher psychic faculties and colours them with some degree of pleasure or displeasure."
A good deal of more or less precise knowledge exists as to the localization of function in relation to discriminated and controlled motor activity, while the areas of sensory radiations which are concerned with more purely cognitive mental activity are also delineated with some exactitude. Pavlov's -ork on conditioned reflexes shows how various sensory and motor functions are analysed in the cortex and how inhibitions may disturb the chain of conditioned responses under certain conditions of cortical activity. Sherrington has shown how the nervous system as a whole exercises an integrative action, and has formulated the principle of reciprocal innervation. Under ordinary circumstances we find that these reciprocal actions are reasonablv harmonious, but become less harmonious as we ascend the scale of nervous levels. The perfect reciprocal action between agonist and antagonist in the sphere of voluntary muscular activity would be a source of continuous wonder were it not such a matter of course. In the vegetative field this is not always so much a matter of course; but in health the ordinary integration of, e.g. contraction and relaxation during the process of peristaltic action of the bowel is so smoothly carried out that we are unconscious of our digestive function. When we come to the emotional field we find less perfect integration in our daily life. Both in animal and human behaviour it is a commonplace to observe the indecisive actions due to a conflict between curiosity and fear, between fear and anger, or between the more complex patterns which we call selfassertion and self-abasement.
When we come to examine pathological conditions in which this integration has broken down we find a state of affairs which I submit throws considerable light on the subject of repression. In the sphere of voluntary mtuscular action let us consider that form of hysterical paralysis which was so common during the war and which is by no means rare even in these days of peace. The limb is held rigid, the flexors and extensors both being in action at once, the action of one group in fact cancelling out the action of the other more or less completely. Close observation showed that if this mutual cancellation was exact and complete the limb was held rigid and still: but if, as was usually the case, it was not exact, minute movements in either direction were permitted. This phenomenon is generally described as treinor, which in these cases might be regular. fine, or gross according as the action of either group escaped from the lock impose(1 by the other, regularly or irregularlv, for an instant or for longer: bilt since this movement is phyvsiologically (listinet from the tremor of organic (lisease it w-ouild be better to describe it as oscillation. ' reaction is familiar enough in the latter. In the ordinary conceptions of repression there is a tendency to represent it as if something superior was sitting on something inferior-as if, for few of us can avoid mental pictures, a virtuous child were sitting on the lid of a jack-in-the-box. But we do not always find the repressed material so much inferior, at any rate from the physiological point of view, and so I prefer the picture of two wrestlers locked in a clinch.
As an example of repression we may cite the case of a man who presented the following psychological situation. He was an only child and had in early life developed strong emotional attitudes towards his parents. He felt great inferiority towards his father more particularly in adolescence, when the latter had openly expressed intolerance at the son's clumsiness in manual activities demanding dexterity. Later the patient had entered upon a scientific career which had been crowned with considerable success, and had proved that he was definitely his father's superior in the intellectual field. The father was a man of narrow and somewhat bigoted religious views, and amongst other difficulties the son expressed great conflict in his religious life, being obsessed with the fear that if he took any rational attitude towards religious matters an offended and vengeful deity would exact some terrible retribution. Here it would seem that a religious complex in which his father's dominance and the emotional attitude towards this dominance was 'locked ' with his scientific complex. Under ordinary circumstances this conflict is of course a common one, but it usually solves itself after a swing in either direction, in which the dogmatism of youth refuses credence either to religion or to science, by the adoption of a compromise such that a realization is possible that the two beliefs are not so incompatible as at first appeared. In spite of his intelligence and openmindedness in other matters, such a compromise was impossible for our patient, and the two patterns held the personality rigid in this respect, with frequent distressing oscillations at all levels of mental activity in the form of symbolic doubts, anxieties, and vegetative disturbances.
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